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Davis v. Combes and the Cautious and Gender-Sensitive Judiciary
Saul Levmore*
December 2, 2019
I.

Davis v. Combes 1

Brenda Combes was a highly-educated and well-employed mother and spouse who died at age
43, following some serious medical issues known to her family. At the time, her surviving
spouse, David Combes, was employed in a less remunerative position, but in describing the facts
of this marriage in Davis v. Combes, Judge Diane Wood, hearing on appeal a case about
Brenda’s life-insurance proceeds, notes that David was often unemployed. It is likely that David
occasionally served as a stay-at-home father. The couple had two children, first a daughter, and
then a son born shortly before his mother’s death. The family’s child-care arrangements are not
revealed by Judge Wood or in the lower court decision she reverses. David Combes had an older
child from a previous marriage, but we are also not told where this child resided. While David
had child-support obligations arising from his earlier divorce, we know that he was able to get
them suspended, at least during his period of unemployment. 2 Brenda and David seemed to keep
their financial lives fairly separate, though David points to various things, like insurance policies
and Brenda’s rental of a bank vault, that he paid for by check or cash. It is plausible that the
couple’s separate accounting was motivated by the details of the termination of his first
marriage. We are also not told whether Brenda died intestate, though it may not have mattered
because the couple had no significant assets other than the life insurance proceeds. They had
purchased a home, but we can assume that it was highly mortgaged.
After Brenda’s death, and accompanied by Brenda’s surviving sister, Linda Davis, David
unlocked the bank vault that he knew contained his wife’s various insurance policies. He was
surprised to find it empty. Documents pertaining to Brenda’s life insurance policies were now in
Linda’s hands. Brenda had recently changed, or tried to change, each of her three insurance
policies to benefit Linda. These policies had previously named David and their daughter as
beneficiaries. Perhaps Linda was coy, or eager to see her much disliked brother-in-law’s reaction
when he opened the empty vault and discovered that his financial situation had been drastically
altered.
Without a doubt, David felt cheated and betrayed, and he eventually developed several legal
arguments for his claim to the policy proceeds. First, he argued that he and Brenda had an
agreement, or contract, to buy matching insurance policies in favor of the other. He produced no
Saul Levmore is the William B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of
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Davis v. Combes, 294 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2002), reviewing Davis v. Combes, No. 98-C-1153, ECF No. 68
(N.D.Ill. Nov. 1, 2000).
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external or written evidence of this agreement, but he had, and had paid for, policies on his own
life that continued to name Brenda as the beneficiary. At times these policies were more
generous to Brenda than were hers to him. One policy named their first child, and this was
consistent with an agreement to provide about equally for their children’s welfare. No policy
named the last-born child, but it is likely that this was because that child was born close to
Brenda’s death when the couple surely was attending to other matters. In any event, the lower
court was convinced that David kept his part of the apparent but unrecorded bargain, and it found
him – and not his sister-in-law, Linda – to be a credible witness regarding Brenda’s intentions
and other matters. It may seem surprising that the couple did not simply choose to each buy one
or more policies on his or her spouse’s life, with the purchaser as beneficiary, but some of the
policies were employer based, so perhaps this was impractical. While Judge Wood does not seem
interested in this, perhaps it is why she notes Brenda’s serious illness. Anything other than a
group policy would have required disclosures or a medical examination, and an individual life
insurance policy would likely have been impossible to obtain. In any event, Brenda’s various
policies probably reflected the fact that she could only obtain modest coverage through her
employment or alumni association, without regard to her medical history. All of these policies
had initially named the couple’s daughter and David as beneficiaries. The changed policies that
Brenda had apparently handed to Linda suddenly named Linda as the sole beneficiary. David
argued that the contract with him was breached by this change in beneficiaries, and that equity
allows or even requires a court to reinstate the contract. If he had such a contract in writing, he
would almost surely enjoy a quick victory under Estate law (as well as under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA). 3
A second argument that might have made it easy for a judge to intervene in favor of the
surviving and financially abandoned spouse and children was that Brenda submitted the most
significant life insurance change to her employer’s human resources department, but did not sign
it, as the policy explicitly required. 4 Linda argues that perhaps her sister did not know where the
Courts are inevitably mixed regarding the importance of adhering to formal requirements where life
insurance contracts are concerned. As the text will explore, a failure to adhere to formal requirements thus
gives courts a chance to do what they think necessary to avoid absurd results or to advance their
conception of what makes for good law. When the contract is about death benefits or retirement payments
governed by ERISA, the matter is slightly different because the ERISA statute is in various places explicit
about the importance of certain formal requirements regarding signatures and attestations. Still, courts
feel somewhat free to say when formalities can be overlooked. To insist that all formal requirements be
met is, of course, to invite litigation, error, and over-investment in meeting the formal requirements. See
Burns v. Orthotek, Inc. Employees’ Pension Plan & Trust, 657 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (overlooking
some formal requirements in order to reach a reasonable result, and citing Davis v. Combes for doing the
same in a non-ERISA case).
4
There have been other cases on this “formality” topic after the case. See, e.g., Hall v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2014) (affirming lower court’s refusal to intervene in policy denial given
policy’s requirement for timely submission, where the decedent both changed his will saying that his wife
should receive insurance proceeds and signed but failed to timely submit a change-of-beneficiary form).
See also, e.g., Kmatz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Fed.Appx. 451 (6th Cir. 2007) (declining to
intervene after finding that decedent’s blank change-of-beneficiary form failed even to substantially
comply with the policy’s requirements). But see, Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Gulley, 668 F.2d
325 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding substantial compliance where decedent left change-of-beneficiary form with
his daughter instead of submitting it to his employer as required by the policy).
3
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signature belonged on the form submitted to mark a change in beneficiary, and the fact that
Brenda physically submitted the form naming Linda as the new beneficiary should be sufficient
and dispositive. But Brenda had managed to correctly sign the other policies and their (identical)
change-of-beneficiary forms. She was, in any event, not unsophisticated. There is the possibility
that Brenda did not sign precisely because the form said that it was not binding until signed and
dated, and she was hesitant about making these important changes. A signature denotes formality
and closure; on the other hand, it is just a scribble that might be missed by someone who has just
spent an hour going through forms with someone pointing to places where a signature, not to
mention some certification or other, is “required.” At the risk of giving away where the argument
here is headed, it is worth noting, or asserting, that Judge Wood (like most judges) is often
comfortable with, and even very much inclined toward, formality and following statutes and
rules when they are on point. 5 It is one thing for important judges to rise to the occasion, and to
draw on their experience and academic skill when statutes are evasive, or even when precedent is
weak – in these situations, they are regularly criticized for making law, or to the contrary for
declining to improve the world around them. It is quite another to do so when this requires
casting aside constitutional or statutory language. As we will see, Davis v. Combes was a oncein-a-career opportunity to do something radical with regard to Estate, Insurance, and Divorce
Law, and it was likely an opportunity to intervene on behalf of gender equality, or at least
unfairly treated women, but it was an opportunity declined or perhaps unnoticed. In defense or in
praise of Judge Wood, it should be noted that courts often face the question of whether to enforce
contractual (or statutory) requirements or to bend a bit and attempt to discern the intent of the
parties. It may be unusual for a circuit court to reverse a lower court on this matter, but here it is
indeed more likely than not that Brenda intended to change the beneficiary designation from her
husband and daughter to her sister. In legal language we can say that though Brenda did not
comply with the stated requirements for changing the beneficiary, she did show “substantial
compliance” by entering her sister’s name as the new beneficiary, delivering the document to her
employer, and even by removing the document from her bank vault and giving it to her sister. To
the extent that appellate cases become known for a single thing, Judge Wood may have decided
that the future of the substantial compliance doctrine was the important matter at stake here.
Returning to the details of the case, my guess is that a lawyer arguing on behalf of a client, like
David Combes, who was essentially dis-inherited by an unsigned document where a signature
was required, would be especially pleased to draw Judge Wood as the decision-maker. In
David’s case, where there is room to bypass the spirit of some of Illinois’ laws, it would be
reasonable to prefer drawing Judge Wood rather than Judge Posner, for example. The latter
might use the occasion to bring into being some new principles of contractual formality,
inheritance law, insurance, or optimal intergenerational transfers, as discussed presently. The law
in every state makes it quite difficult to disinherit a spouse, 6 for example, and it is easy to
imagine an aggressive judge extending this principle to its interpretation of life insurance
policies, especially so when these policies contain the bulk of family assets. Where there is room
to enforce the requirement that a document effectively dis-inheriting my client be signed, I
This tendency is evident from other Essays, in honor of Judge Wood, in this issue of The University of
Chicago Law Review.
6
“49 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia limit freedom of testation vis-à-vis the surviving
spouse,” whether by forced heirship, elective share, or community property. T.L. Turnipseed, Community
Property v. The Elective Share, 72 La. L. Rev. 161, 162 (2011).
5
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would want a judge known to enforce legal requirements, rather than one prone to creativity and
to fashioning new law. It is only fair to note that Judge Wood may have simply felt bound by
Illinois law, which strongly adopts the view that one can dispose of assets one possesses; it
practically rejects the Uniform Probate Code’s tendency to view a couple as a partnership. Still,
David Combes, as a single parent with two young children and a low earned-income history (not
to mention an older, but still minor, child for whom he had some responsibility), as well as
testimony that a lower court found credible, is a sympathetic plaintiff, and one with the signature
requirement on his side. It is not the ideal case to advance the cause of substantial compliance.
To be clear, if Brenda had signed the documents favoring her sister over her surviving husband
and child, and had told David of her changes, we could be sure Judge Wood would adhere to the
Illinois statute’s insistence on following the individual property owner’s intentions and
declarations. As a lawyer, my only hope would be to get Judge Posner rather than Wood, for
only an aggressive judge would say that when all the life insurance and circumstances are added
together, David had essentially been dis-inherited, and law does not and should not favor such an
outcome. While one judge might say that a legislature that allowed a surviving spouse to elect
against a will, in order to avoid complete dis-inheritance, signaled that it did not intend
equivalent protection for a spouse who was dislocated by a change in insurance beneficiaries, a
more aggressive judge might say that the same legislature showed that it wished to protect
surviving spouses, and so that principle ought to apply to a case like Davis v. Combes. The latter
sort of contextual judicial intervention would be easiest – or even only conceivable – when, as in
Davis v. Combes, the dis-inheritance is accomplished in secrecy and thus does not allow room
for a bargain between the spouses while they are alive. It is, after all, possible that had David
known that Brenda changed the policies, he would have moved toward divorce, and through this
means possibly have secured financial support for himself and the couple’s children. To be sure,
Brenda’s death might have made this strategy of little value, but it is possible that a court
supervising the divorce would have required a trust fund in the children’s favor.
My suggestion about what an aggressive judge might do, brings us to what we might call a fourth
and equally subtle argument in David’s favor. It is that while our laws are less explicitly
egalitarian than most of Europe’s, we essentially have the spirit of dower (or even of forced
heirship) in our country. We should not expect lawyers to ask courts to institute laws that are
rejected by our legislatures, but it is worth thinking about the spirit of these statutes and their
migration into American law. Many statutes (and even Illinois’ divorce law) treat the family as a
partnership, or simply reflect the view that survivors ought to be supported. Marriage typically
promises the surviving spouse something between one-third and two-thirds of the family’s estate,
whether or not the decedent leaves a will, or even leaves a will that seeks to disinherit the
surviving spouse. Even funds given away some time before death to a charity can be clawed
back to the estate and subject to forced heirship, and the same is probably true for wealth given
away just before divorce.
Outside of Louisiana, our states do not have forced heirship statutes, but they have all taken
some steps in the direction of treating a family, and certainly marriage, as a partnership of sorts. 7
They have Homestead Allowances, for example, so that the survivor is not left without a place to

7

La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (2019).
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sleep. 8 Most also ensure that the survivor receives an amount sufficient to support the couple’s
previous lifestyle for the larger portion of a year. 9 Community property states treat property
acquired during the marriage as equally owned, and divide it accordingly upon death or divorce.
Most significantly, nearly all the other states give the survivor the right to elect against the will.10
If the will disinherits the surviving spouse by giving $1, for instance, the survivor has some
months to think about it and then to decline the $1 and elect to receive one-third or one-half of
the “estate.” In some states this is the probate estate and in some it is the enhanced, or
augmented, estate. 11 For our purposes, the details are not important except for two things. First,
life insurance is not included in the probate estate, and Illinois, the Combes’ home state, is
neither a community property state nor one that augments estates. 12 In Illinois, one can take a
step toward disinheriting a spouse by buying a large amount of life insurance, and naming
someone other than the spouse as beneficiary. Note that even in states that, unlike Illinois, clawback life insurance to the estate, the claw-back applies to expenditures made to purchase
insurance, rather than to the proceeds of an insurance policy. 13 In any event, recall that the battle
in our case is not (yet) about a probate or enhanced estate. It is fair to deduce that David and his
young children’s only hope for money was for the proceeds of the insurance policies. 14
Before putting Judge Wood and the role of the judiciary at the center of the story, it is worth
emphasizing the omitted and unknown variables. Perhaps Brenda knew that her sister would be a
better caregiver for her children than would David, though it is worth repeating that the lower
court found Linda evasive and not credible as a witness; there is no hint that she would be the
superior caregiver, and she refused the idea of putting the insurance proceeds in a trust for the
children. 15 Still, Brenda may have had faith in Linda, or fears about David’s future intentions.
She may have sought to change her life insurance policies in order to give her sister funds to help
For the Illinois version, protecting the surviving spouse (and minor child) while living in the home, see
735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-901 and 5/12-902 (2019).
9
In Illinois, 755 ILCS 5/15-1, the protection is for the cost of living for a nine-month period, with a
minimum of $20,000, and significantly more where there are dependent children.
10
Georgia, the exception, offers instead a “year’s support in the form of property” to a decedent’s
surviving spouse and minor children. Ga. Code Ann. § 53-3-1 (2018).
11
While an issue of some historic debate, the Uniform Probate Code and the 22 states which follow it
include life insurance in the augmented estate. Unif. Probate Code § 2-202–205, 2-208 (amended 2010);
see also G. Michael Bridge, Note, Uniform Probate Code Section 2-202: A Proposal to Include Life
Insurance Assets Within the Augmented Estate, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 511 (1988-1989).
12
See generally, James J. Carroll, The Interplay of Probate Assets and Nonprobate Assets in the
Administration of a Decedent’s Estate, 25 DePaul L. Rev. 363 (1976). Illinois law does not include life
insurance proceeds in the elective share. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 35/2-8 (West 2019).
13
Thus, if A buys a policy and names his new partner, G, as the beneficiary of a million-dollar policy, A’s
surviving spouse, B, might claw back the $50,000 premium paid for the policy, but not the entire $1
million dollars payable to G. See Carroll, supra note 11.
14
Students of Trusts and Estates Law may want to know whether David could have elected against the
will, if there was one; not least given that Illinois is not a community property state. We can avoid the
details here, and note the important point that there were at least three ways for a judge to decide in
David’s favor, and against Brenda’s sister. Most of these methods would have split the difference
between the surviving spouse and the named sibling, because the unsigned change-of-beneficiary form
affected only one of three insurance policies.
15
Davis v. Combes, No. 98-C-1153, ECF No. 68 at 16, 22 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 1, 2000).
8
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with the task of caring for the surviving children. A philosophically interesting possibility is that
Brenda resented and feared David’s obligation or inclination to care for the child from his
previous marriage. The child was a teenager at the time of Brenda’s death and, with the cost of
college in mind, Brenda may have been concerned that the family’s assets, which she might well
have thought of as generated by her rather than by David, would be directed unfairly to that first
child. In short, Brenda may have been just the sort of person Illinois law (and then Judge Wood)
sought to empower. To be sure, she could have set up a trust in favor of her children, in order to
exclude David’s first child from access to her assets, but this involves effort and requires some
thought about other unforeseen events. If her sister were trustworthy, it would be easier to direct
assets to her, and to direct Linda about appropriate expenditures. These seem like reasonable
possibilities that might have influenced Judge Wood and the lower court. Without explicit
evidence, one or all the involved courts may have hesitated to explain the reasoning in print. On
the other hand, it seems unlikely that Judge Wood would reverse the lower court – for it too was
aware that Illinois law required a high level of proof before imposing a constructive trust –
inasmuch as it knew more about the parties than she would likely have known simply from
reading their lawyers’ papers.
II.

The Role of Gender

I think it is plausible, or perhaps likely, that if the genders were reversed, Judge Wood would
have decided the case differently. In an unscientific poll, I have tried these inverted facts on
many law professors, educated citizens, and a few elected officials. I ask them, and now my
readers, to imagine the case of a well-employed husband, Brian, who has several young children
and a stay-at-home wife, Dina, who has occasionally been employed, but who earns much less
income than does Brian. The couple does not have much savings, but each has life insurance
policies. If Dina dies, Brian will need to hire a child-care person and, if Brian dies, Dina will be
quite stressed and will need to replace Brian’s income, look for a better-paying job than she has
at present, and find enough money to pay for child-care. She will be a single mother with two
very young children. Now imagine that not only does Brian die, but also that Dina discovers,
when it is too late to react, that he secretly changed the beneficiaries of his life insurance policies
to someone other than his spouse. Fortunately for his spouse, one of the changes he sought to
make was unsigned, and a signature was required. Lawyers, and even non-lawyer citizens
accustomed to secure property rights, tend to like the idea that a person who made money gets to
decide how to spend it, but virtually everyone I have asked thinks that – even in Illinois – a court
should and will take advantage of the fact that one form was unsigned in order to give the
surviving and surprised spouse, Dina, some money. About half of the respondents think courts
should find a way to give Dina the proceeds of all the insurance policies, and not just the one that
had an unsigned change-of-beneficiary form. Essentially, they find the forced heirship norm
attractive, and might even go beyond the rules found around the world. They think of the family
as a team, and especially so because Dina was occupied at home in the interest of the family, we
might presume, when she could have been out earning money and advancing her own career. If
Brian sought to divorce her, everyone thinks that a court should award her (and the children)
considerable resources at least until the children are of age. But he did not seek divorce, and
instead he died (in this hypothetical) – and secretly changed his insurance policies to disfavor his
surviving spouse. It is hard to see why Dina should do any worse in these circumstances than she
would have in the event of abandonment and divorce by Brian. Most who think that Brian’s
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sibling, or another third party, is entitled to one or two of the life insurance policies’ proceeds,
because Brian is entitled to do with “his” money as he likes, and especially so in Illinois where
this intuition is written into the statute, also think the sibling-recipient is morally bound to apply
much of the money to the upbringing of Dina’s children.
Before turning to the forced heirship principle more directly, it may be useful to restate the point
implicitly made here. It is that Judge Wood has been influenced by evolving sentiments about
gender. If the surviving spouse had been female, I think it quite likely that the decision would
have drawn on at least two out of three of the arguments advanced by David. There was the
failure to sign one of the documents, and then the argument that Brenda broke an implicit
agreement. She may even have committed fraud, inducing her spouse to buy life insurance on his
own life with her as the beneficiary, but then failing to keep her side of the bargain and, for all
we know, planning on this all along. The fact that by all accounts she sought to change the
beneficiary without informing David, adds significantly to this version of the story.
It is inappropriate and even beside the point to insist that Judge Wood was wrong and influenced
by gender, even though law claims to be neutral about this characteristic. But appellate court
decisions are meant to be followed, and it should be noted that the next time a case like Davis v.
Combes arises, it will likely be a single mother who is left unmoored and without money. On the
other hand, as noted presently, perhaps Judge Wood had other fish to fry.
III.

Protecting the Abandoned Spouse: Treating Widows as Well as Divorced Parties

I turn now to the observation that the decision in Davis v. Combes goes about as far as it can to
distance itself from the idea of forced heirship. Again, as a technical matter, the case is not about
forced heirship or its American second-cousin, electing against the will (a descendant of dower),
because Illinois law does not recapture life insurance into the estate subject to the nodisinheritance principle. 16 Still, it is worth thinking about the comparison among three ways to
disappoint, or even cheat, an abandoned spouse. These are: (1) Divorce, followed by a battle
over assets and future earnings; (2) Death – where the decedent attempts to dis-inherit the
surviving spouse; (3) Death – where there is no will or simply few assets, and where the
abandoned spouse is surprised to learn that she or he has been removed as the beneficiary of the
insurance policy. I will refer to these three cases as (1) Divorce, (2) Dis-inheriting, and (3) Disinsuring. It is apparent that the word “abandoned” can be thought of as financial as well as
physical abandonment. Davis v. Combes is obviously an example of case (3). Case (1) is the
most common of the three, and has accordingly received the most statutory and judicial attention.
Case (2) falls in between the other two, because of the ability to elect against the will and
otherwise ensure a spousal share of the estate. I have already signaled that the major goal of this
Part is to advance the argument for treating the three cases alike, based on arguments about
equality, partnership, ethical sensibilities, and the potential that (2) and (3) could be turned into
(1), by bargain or by preemptory action, unless the fact of (2) or (3) is kept secret. The
suggestion is that secrecy is a kind of fraud, and where there is secrecy there is an even stronger
755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 30/1-401 (West 2019) (“The designation in accordance with the terms of any
insurance… shall not be subject to or defeated or impaired by any statute or rule of law governing the
transfer of property by will, gift, or intestacy.”)

16
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case for treating the abandoned, or surviving, spouse as well as she (or he) would have been
treated in the event of (1), a court supervised divorce.
One problem with this approach is that (2) and (3) are quite different from (1) because in the
event of divorce the abandoning spouse enjoys future earnings and these are obviously not
available in the event of death. To be sure, the divorcing spouse also has future living costs,
especially in the event of a second marriage to someone without wealth or with children to
support. For the most part, this difference between abandonment by life or death raises a set of
efficiency concerns. It is unwise or politically unacceptable to discourage re-marriage by either
spouse or to discourage either from continuing a career or seeking higher earnings, because the
income is to be shared. This is a familiar problem in family law, and there is no reason to rehash
it here. Here, as in the optimal tax literature, it seems ideal to have an immediate once-and-for-all
allocation based perhaps on expected future earnings and costs, but as a practical matter this is
difficult. I hope it is acceptable to insist that the allocations normally made in divorce law, or for
that matter in forced heirship jurisdictions, are good enough. That is, there may be more money
available because the abandoning spouse continues to work, and has not died, but we can
imagine that it all works out. Thus, in the case of divorce we might imagine that the abandoned
spouse receives half of present wealth as well as half of future income for a period of years
(often depending on the age of the children), while the abandoning party can live or develop
another family with the remaining half. Meanwhile, if the marriage ends because of death rather
than divorce, there is no future income or subsequent family to consider but, somehow, we can
imagine that the abandoned family again gets about half (of the smaller amount now available),
while the abandoning party is free to allocate the other half as he likes, thus half-satisfying the
widely-held view that one who makes money is entitled to dispose of it. It is a sloppy fallback
position to be sure, but again it can be superseded by contract or in most cases by a decision to
divorce rather than to trust the partner or require a formal trust instrument.
Another, perhaps legalistic, problem is that the suggestion that these three cases ought to be
treated alike ignores the existence or absence of implied contracts, signatures on insurance
documents, and so forth. The argument here comes close to saying that it should not matter
whether Brenda Combes signed or intended to sign the change-of-beneficiary form at her
disposal. If her marriage was a partnership, and her partner is entitled to at least half of the
available money, then we are close to the forced heirship norm, and far from the American
understanding of contract and property law. One response to this (decidedly old-fashioned)
objection is that deception makes all the difference. If Brenda had informed David of her
decision, he could have sought divorce or agreed to a contract or trust document that would have
ensured that the available money was used for the benefit of the couple’s children rather than for
the benefit of his first child or even to support a lifestyle he might seek with a new spouse after
Brenda’s death. We do not know Brenda’s motivations, and it may be that our ethical sentiments
would be on her side rather than David’s, if she had reason to fear one of these possibilities. But
a legal rule that forces information from her might be a good thing, or even a worthy
compromise. The same might be said of many cases of dis-inheritance. The legal way to say this
is that deception is a kind of fraud in these cases, and that law can discourage it with a rule that
treats the abandoned spouse in cases (2) and (3) about the same as it would in case (1), that of
divorce. On the other hand, if there is full disclosure and time to negotiate or seek divorce, then
there is a good argument for respecting a decision like that which Brenda made. My argument
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for treating (1), (2), and (3) about the same, might be limited for the time being to instances
where there is deception at the expense of the abandoned party.
Most lawyers, and certainly Judge Wood, would regard most of the arguments here with some
incredulity because these arguments avoid the question of the balance of decision-making
authority between legislatures and judge. As we have seen, Illinois law is unfriendly to David
Combes, and likely much on Judge Wood’s mind. Still, the argument here is made possible by
the fact that Brenda failed to sign an important document, and she arguably defrauded her
husband and denied him the opportunity to bargain or seek divorce. All this gives a judge the
opportunity to innovate. But as for the larger picture, legislatures have worked hard to fashion
one’s ability to elect against a will, and they have clearly chosen not to fully follow the European
model of forced heirship. Similarly, the Illinois legislature could have said that case (3) is to be
equalized with case (1), and the rules of division in the event of divorce could be more or less
delegated to courts, depending on the legislature’s view.
And yet there are important areas of law where the common-law process, even in modern times,
has exerted great influence, and judges reason that the legislature can always overrule them with
explicit statutes. Thus, comparative negligence came about in some states through aggressive and
innovative judges, perhaps motivated by a sense of ethical sensibilities in their surrounding
societies. 17 It would be easy to slow down here and just point to the fact that the decedent did not
sign her change-of-beneficiary form as required, or that she was party to an implicit or even an
explicit contract. But I prefer the more aggressive conclusion that cases (1), (2), and (3) should
be treated alike, and that judges can rise to the occasion and make them so, knowing that their
judge-made law can be reversed by legislatures or even by state constitutions. In any event,
Judge Wood missed an opportunity to be innovative or to explain why this was the wrong case to
move law in a direction that seems both ethical and efficient to most observers. It would also
have been a direction that would have benefited women in the long run but, unfortunately, the
case that came before her involved an abandoned man rather than an abandoned and sympathetic
woman.
Finally, it may well be that Judge Wood thought of all this and decided that creating a precedent
about formalities, and the substantial compliance doctrine, was more important than the
possibilities suggested here. She did, in the end, send the Seventh Circuit firmly in the direction
of the substantial compliance doctrine, 18 so that a failure to sign, for example, is not dispositive,
and lower courts are encouraged not to take contractual, and perhaps statutory, requirements too
seriously. This Essay has suggested that there was something far more interesting and important
than substantial compliance at stake in Davis v. Combes, but the suggestion may be wrong.
Diane Wood is not, of course, a judge to be underestimated.
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